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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
unlawful speed. Accordingly, the Court concluded, the statute was "too vague
for validity".
Al'hough there was some evidence to support the state's contention that
the statute was intended to be a proscription against "a speed which is greater
than that which is reasonable and prudent under the conditions",5 7 the Court
refused to twist the language of the statute into that meaning. It deemed the
face of the statute to be controlling, r.ot the unexpressed intention of the legislature.
Since the Court rejected the state's interpretation of the statute, the constitutionality of a "negligence" type of statute remains an open question in New
York. However, the greater weight of authority 58 has sustained such statutes
on the ground that the historic support of the common law has provided the
concept of negligence with meaning and boundaries sufficient to enable a person of ordinary intelligence safely to estimate"9 what course of conduct to pursue, and sufficient to provide a standard by which a jury can appraise a defendant's conduct.00
In contrast to the "negligence" type of statute, the inadequacies of the invalidated statute are readily apparent. The latter, in effect, imposes liability
without fault and makes a driver the insurer of public safety. Since, as the
Court pointed out, any speed is capable of endangering life, limb or properly,
a person would have to discontinue driving in order to completely avoid the
reach of this statute.
Municipal Regulation of Transport and Dumping of Garbage
The Town of Somers,
ordinance prohibiting the
garbage originating outside
a private dump within the
57.

acting pursuant to statutory authority, 1 enacted an
transportation and dumping within the town of
the town. The plaintiff, who had been operating
township with a collection area embracing several

GOVERNOR'S CONFERENcE REPORT ON "HIGHWAY AND T.ArFFIc SAFETY,

p. 22

(1940).
58. See State v. Wojahn, 204 Or. 84, 282 P.2d 675 (1955), which is a good
review of legislation in this area. Also see People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 183
N.E. 273 (1932).
59. Wash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913), Holmes J.:
[T~he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends
on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury substquently
estimates it, some matter of degree.
60. People v. McMurchy, 294 Mich. 47, 228 N.W. 723, 734 (1930):
The term "negligence" is so well known, the elements so
certain, the definitions so definitely settled, and the precedents so many, that there is nothing indefinite whatsoever

about it.

61. N. Y.
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§130(6).
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townships, brought this action to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance, alleging principally its unconstitutionality. He argued that the ordinance was violative of due process, being "unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious" in that it prohibited importation of garbage without in any way regulating the quantity of local garbage which could be "dumped". Hence, the ordinance did not directly relate to public health factors but rather was a discriminatory restriction only. The Court held that the prohibition of transportation of garbage on public highways was not valid, since it exceeded the power of the town board to regulate traffic. 62 However, the prohibition of dump63
ing foreign garbage within the town was valid and constitutional.
Property privately held is subject nonetheless to the right of the legislative power to regulate its use, provided that the regulation is not "unreasonable or arbitrary" and that it is "reasonably related and applied to some actual
and manifest evil" within the competence of the police power sought to be exercised.64 The problem of applying these standards is particularly acute where
the effect of the regulation involved is to exclude business at political boundaries, since prima facie the possibility of discrimination between local and
foreign interests is involved.6 5
In the instant case, the Court took judicial notice of factors making the
control of dumping activities an object of legitimate local concern. The deleterious effects of garbage and dumping in general on real estate values as well
as the general living conditions were necessarily involved. The majority rejected the allegation of arbitrariness inasmuch as the ordinance, to the extent
that it dealt with dumping itself, as a practical matter tended to place an upper limit on the quantity of the material deposited in the township, thereby
conserving dumping facilities and cutting down on the normal harmful effects
incident to waste material. The ordinance seemed a fair compromise in effecting
the interests of the community: (1) to make ample facilities available to local residents and (2) to limit the total amount of garbage dumped. A restriction on a general tonnage or other quota basis applying equally to residents
and non-residents would not have adequately served the community interest,
since the quota might be used up by foreign garbage leaving local disposal
needs unsatisfied.
Because there was a rational explanation for the ordinance which would
62. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §§54, 90; People v. Grant, 306 N.Y.
258, 117 N.E.2d 542 (1954).
63. Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958).
64. Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829
(1956); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
65. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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justify its passage, 6 the Court held that the presumption in favor of constitutionality of statutes had not been overcome.G7 It was incumbent on the plaintiff to show, beyond a reasonable doubt,68 that there was no possible reasonable has is for the classification of the ordinance.
Judge Desmond dissented, agreeing with the plaintiff that there was no
rational explanation, but rather that the ordinance was an arbitrary interference with his property interests. This is the position which has been adopted
elsewhere, 9 but the majority rationale would seem preferable.
The Court of Appeals has been reluctant, as demonstrated in a 1956 case,
Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond70 to uphold regulatory statutes which
have the effect of prohibiting the introduction of goods into commerce even
71
Inthough a legitimate goal of legislative policy was seemingly present.
of
marvolved there, however, was regulation and restriction on the movement
ketable goods. Cases such as the instant one present strong arguments which
may not be available elsewhere. The regulation of what is by its nature a "necessary evil" should be viewed most liberally by the courts. Although the Court
spoke in terms of reasonableness of purpose in the garbage situation, perhaps
the result is pointed up by viewing this as simply an area where equal treatment between local and foreign residents is not necessary because of the peculiar interest of the local community in the subject matter. Viewed as such, the
result appears analogous to those cases, for example, which allow states to restrict the enjoyment of. wild life to residents on a theory of property interest
of the sovereign therein. 72
Gross Receipts Tax Applied to Publishing Contract Upheld
It is well settled that the liberty of the press is safeguarded by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 Freedom of the press as well
as those other "fundamental" liberties essential to "a scheme of ordered liberty"
enjoys a unique position74 in our society, a position that can not be infringed
upon directly.75 The press is free from censorship. This is not to say, however,
66. United States v. C='olene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
67. Borden's Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209-210 (1934).
68. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911).
69. See Ex parte Lyons, 27 C.A.2d 182, 80 P.2d 745 (1938); People v. Marine Products Co., 77 C.A.2d 929, 177 P.2d 67 (1947).
70. Supra note 64.
71. See Limitations on Police Power, 6 BuFFALo L. REV. 42 (1956).
72. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
73. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
74. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
75. See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), where the exaction of
a tax as a condition to the exercise of the liberties secured by the First Amendment was considered obnoxious.

